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Insurance
BY TAMA KIRBY KNAPP*
INTRODUCTION
During the survey period,' Kentucky courts addressed insur-
ance contract provisions dealing with double indemnity cover-
age, 2 the household exclusion clause,3 first party bad faith4 and
underinsurance stacking.' Kentucky courts also interpreted the
Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA)6 in the areas
of attorneys' fees, 7 the calculation of work loss benefits8 and the
threshold requirements. 9 This survey discusses those decisions
that had a significant impact on Kentucky insurance law.' 0
* J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky, 1986. The author expresses her apprecia-
tion to Richard H. Underwood, Associate Professor of Law, for his assistance in the
preparation of this survey.
The survey period runs from July, 1984, to July, 1985.
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Fryman, No. 84-CA-698-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 18,
1985), discretionary rev. granted, 32 Ky. L. Sui~a. 9, at 27 (Ky. June 26, 1985)
[hereinafter cited as KLS].
I Staser v. Fulton, 684 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
4 Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ky., Inc. v. Whitaker, 687 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1985).
LaFrange v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, No. 84-CA-304-MR (Ky. Ct. App.
Sept. 28, 1984), aff'd, 700 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1985).
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.39-010 to .39-340 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981 & Cum.
Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
7 Baker v. Motorists Ins. Co., 695 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1985); MFA Ins. Co. v.
Carroll, 687 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
1 Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 681 S.W.2d 919
(Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
Southard v. Hancock, 689 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
See cases cited supra notes 2-5, 7-9. Kentucky decisions reported during this
survey period that involve insurance law issues, but which will not be addressed, include:
O'Bannon v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 678 S.W.2d 390 (Ky. 1984); Federal Kemper
Ins. Co. v. Homback, No. 84-CA-2215-MR (Ky. Ct. App. June 21, 1985), petition for
discretionary rev. filed, 32 KLS 10, at 8 (Ky. July 10, 1985); American Hardware Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Fryer, 692 S.W.2d 278 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 684 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Richmond, 676 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Warren, 675
S.W.2d 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
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I. THE CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT
A. Double Indemnity Coverage
In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Fryman," Fryman was killed
in an accident resulting from driving his motorcycle at an exces-
sive speed while intoxicated.' 2 Fryman's life insurance policy
contained a double indemnity provision for "accidental" death. 3
Thus, the Kentucky Court of Appeals faced the issue whether
Fryman's death was "accidental" within the meaning of that
provision. 4
Kentucky decisions define "accident" as used in insurance
contracts as "an event that takes place without one's foresight
or expectation."' 5 If, however, Fryman "should reasonably have
anticipated' '16 that his death would be the "natural and probable
consequence of his act,' '1 7 then his "reckless disregard for an
obvious danger ... contributed to his own fatal injury, and...
was not accidental."' 8 This was the first time a Kentucky court
had been confronted with the issue presented in Fryman, so the
court looked to a similar Tennessee case for guidance.19
In Hobbs v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co.,20
the Tennessee Supreme Court stated:
" No. 84-CA-698-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 1985), discretionary rev. granted,
32 KLS 9, at 27 (Ky. June 26, 1985).
,2 See id. at 1. William Fryman's blood alcohol level was .20%. Id.
Id. at 2.
" Id. The Nicholas Circuit Court held that Fryman's death was accidental; how-
ever, the court of appeals reversed that decision. Id.
" Donohue v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 82 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Ky. 1935), cited in
No. 84-CA-698-MR, slip op. at 3 (quoting Huffman v. Commonwealth, 234 S.W. 962,
964 (Ky. 1921); Pack v. Prudential Casualty Co., 185 S.W. 496, 498 (Ky. 1916)). For a
general discussion of recovery for accidental injury or death, see IA APPLEMAN, INSUR-
ANCE LAW AND PRAcTcE §§ 360-62 (1981).
11 Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Willet, 557 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977), cited in No. 84-CA-698-MR, slip op. at 3.
557 S.W.2d at 224.
" Id. The Willet court held that the insured's death was not accidental within the
meaning of the double indemnity provision, because the insured should have reasonably
anticipated that during his struggle over a gun the gun would discharge and he would
be injured. Id. See National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, 86 S.W.2d 139 (Ky.
1935).
No. 84-CA-698-MR, slip op. at 2 (citing Hobbs v. Provident Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 535 S.W.2d 864 (Tenn. 1975)).
20 535 S.W.2d 864.
INSURANCE
We can certainly assume that the danger of injury or death as
[sic] result of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated is a
foreseeable one and the appellate courts of this State have
repeatedly held that death is not caused by accidental means,
within the meaning of an insurance policy, if it is a foreseeable
result of a voluntary and unnecessary act or course of conduct
of the insured .2
In addition, the Kentucky court relied on Prosser's remark
that "one who intentionally or negligently becomes intoxicated
is held thereafter to the same standard of conduct as if he were
sober." 22
The Fryman decision combined the rationale set forth in
Hobbs and the standard espoused ,by Prosser. The court rea-
soned that a "prudent person of ordinary sense ' 2 3 would have
reasonably foreseen death as a consequence of driving a motor-
cycle at an excessive speed while intoxicated.24 Therefore, the
court held that Fryman's death resulted from his "reckless dis-
regard for obvious danger, ' 2- and was not "accidental" as that
word is judicially construed in Kentucky insurance contracts. 26
Thus, Fryman's estate was denied extended coverage because the
double indemnity provision did not apply to his death.27
B. The Household Exclusion
In Staser v. Fulton,21 Robert Staser, the driver, was killed in
an automobile accident in which the passengers, his wife and
Id. at 866.
No. 84-CA-698-MR, slip op. at 2 (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32, at
154 (4th Ed. 1971)). In other factual situations, Kentucky courts have imposed the same
standard of conduct on a voluntarily intoxicated person as is imposed on a sober person
of ordinary sense acting under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Harlow v. Connelly, 548
S.W.2d 143, 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (Personal injury plaintiff was contributorily
negligent by knowingly riding with a drunken driver, even though the plaintiff was then
intoxicated, because a prudent person would not have ridden with a person in the
driver's condition.); Wootton v. Dixon, 228 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Ky. 1950) (In a personal
injury action, the court held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that a
voluntarily intoxicated person is held to the same standard of care as a prudent sober
person was reversible error.).
:' No. 84-CA-698-MR, slip op. at 3.
- Id.
Id. (citing 557 S.W.2d 222).
" No. 84-CA-698-MR, slip op. at 3 (citing 82 S.W.2d 780).
' No. 84-CA-698-MR, slip op. at 3.
684 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
1985-86]
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daughters, were injured. The wife and daughters brought an
action against Staser's estate to recover damages caused by his
negligent operation of the automobile. 29 Staser's insurance pol-
icy, written by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State
Farm), included a typical household or family exclusion clause
that provided: "There is no coverage ... for any bodily injury
to ... any member of an insured's family residing in the in-
sured's household. ' 30 The issue presented to the court of appeals
was the amount of liability coverage available to the injured
family members in light of the Kentucky Supreme Court's de-
cision in Bishop v. Allstate Insurance Co. 3 1
The Bishop Court recognized that one of the express pur-
poses of the MVRA is to assure a minimum level of tort liability
coverage for automobile owners.3 2 Elimination or reduction of
coverage below the minimum requirement leaves the automobile
owner completely or partially uninsured and, consequently, of-
fends the purpose of the MVRA. 33 The Bishop Court concluded,
therefore, that a household exclusion provision that eliminates
or reduces tort liability coverage below the minimum statutory
requirement is void and unenforceable.3 4
Id. at 306.
Id. at 306-07 (emphasis added). For recent Kentucky decisions dealing with a
household exclusion clause, see Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 19S1);
Withers v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 626 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); and Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 522 S.W.2d 184 (Ky. 1975). A
detailed discussion of Bishop and Withers can be found in Underwood, Kentucky Law
Survey-Insurance, 70 Ky. L.J. 255, 262-65 (1981-82).
684 S.W.2d at 307 (citing Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 S.W.2d 865 (Ky.
1981)).
3 623 S.W.2d at 866 (construing KRS § 304.39-010(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1981)). When
Staser was decided, KRS § 304.39-1 10(1) required automobile owners to carry a minimum
tort liability coverage of $10,000 per person for personal injuries, $20,000 per accident
for personal injuries, and $5,000 for property damage. That section has been amended
to require a minimum tort liability coverage of either 1) $25,000 per person for personal
injuries, $50,000 per accident for personal injuries, and $10,000 for property damage or
2) $60,000 regardless of whether the liability incurred in an accident is for personal
injury or for property damage. KRS § 304.39-110(1) (effective July 13, 1984).
1 623 S.W.2d at 866 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sivey, 272 N.W.2d
555 (Mich. 1978)).
623 S.W.2d at 866 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. DeFrain, 265 N.W.2d 392 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1978)). The Kentucky Supreme Court in Bishop acknowledged that household
exclusion clauses in insurance policies had been upheld before the enactment of the
MVRA. 623 S.W.2d at 866 (citing Allen v. West American Ins. Co., 467 S.W.2d 123
[Vol. 74
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In Staser, the injured family members argued that they could
recover the full policy limit's because Bishop voided the house-
hold exclusion clause that was the basis of State Farm's denial
of maximum coverage. Nevertheless, the Staser court held that
the household exclusion clause was not to be read completely
out of the policy, as the family members contended, but that
the exclusion was void only to the extent that the minimum
coverage mandated by the MVRA was reduced or eliminated.
Therefore, the court agreed with State Farm's contention that
under Bishop, Staser's household members could recover the
minimum statutory limits but not the maximum policy limits.
3 6
Thus, an insurance policy may validly exclude household
members from tort liability coverage in excess of the minimum
requirement imposed on all automobile owners by the MVRA.
To the extent that an insurance policy reduces coverage for
household members below the minimum statutory level, how-
ever, it is void.3 7
C. First Party Bad Faith
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kentucky, Inc. v. Whitaker3"
was an action by the insured, Whitaker, against his insurer, Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Kentucky, Inc. (Blue Cross), to recover
medical expenses under his insurance contract. Whitaker's doctor
had reported to Blue Cross that Whitaker's medical expenses
were caused by a health condition that had existed for two or
three years. Since the insurance contract had only recently be-
come effective, Blue Cross denied coverage under the policy's
pre-existing condition clause. The day before trial the doctor
informed Blue Cross that his initial report was incorrect and
(Ky. 1971); Orange v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969);
Third Nat'l Bank of Ashland v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334 S.W.2d 261 (Ky.
1960)). These cases, however, were specifically overruled in Bishop to the extent that
the exclusion reduced or eliminated the minimum coverage required by the MVRA. 623
S.W.2d at 866-67.
11 684 S.W.2d at 307. Maximum coverage under the State Farm policy was $50,000
for personal injuries sustained by any one person and $100,000 for all personal injuries
sustained in any one accident. Id.
" Id.
'" See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
" 687 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
1985-861
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that Whitaker's medical problem was a new one. Nevertheless,
Blue Cross did not pay the claim, but proceeded with the trial.
The jury awarded Whitaker his hospital and surgical expenses
under the policy, in addition to consequential damages for Blue
Cross' bad faith denial of coverage. Blue Cross did not thereafter
contest the awaid of medical expenses. On appeal, however,
Blue Cross argued that its denial of coverage did not constitute
first party bad faith nor did it entitle Whitaker to recover
consequential damages. 39
The tort of first party bad faith was recognized in Feathers
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co."0 as a new cause of action
in Kentucky. 4' Such an action may be brought against an insurer
who allegedly displays bad faith in denying payment of proceeds
to its insured. 42 Feathers announced that the insured could re-
cover punitive and consequential damages for the insurer's tor-
tious conduct 3.4 The only indication in Feathers, however, as to
the degree of bad faith necessary to recover consequential dam-
ages for the insurer's wrongful conduct was: "We [the court]
are not talking about bad manners or mere breakdowns in
communications .. .
Blue Cross further defined the Feathers standard. The court
stated that "mere errors in judgment should not be sufficient to
establish bad faith. ' 45 Moreover, an action for first party bad
faith requires "something more than mere negligence.'' 46 The
insurer must have. shown an intentional, willful, or reckless
disregard for its insured's rights. 47 The court held that the denial
9 Id. at 558, 560.
667 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983). For further discussion of Feathers, see
Clay, Kentucky Law Survey-Insurance, 73 Ky. L.J. 423 (1984-85). For a detailed
examination of the insured's remedy in tort for his insurer's failure to deal in good
faith, see 16A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 8878-79 (1981).
41 667 S.W.2d at 696.
42 See id.
11 Id. at 696-97. Prior to Feathers, Kentucky courts had consistently held that only
the amount due under the insurance policy could be recovered for the breach of a first
party insurance contract. 687 S.W.2d at 559 (citing Deaton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 548
S.W.2d 162 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v.
Judd, 400 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1966)).
" 667 S.W.2d at 696, cited in 687 S.W.2d at 559.





of coverage by Blue Cross was illustrative of a "breakdown in
communications. ' 48 Blue Cross' "delay [in admitting liability]
of one day, upon learning of the true facts ' 49 was not "so
dilatory as to constitute bad faith." 50 The finding of bad faith,
and thus the award of consequential damages, was therefore
reversed."
D. Underinsurance Stacking
LaFrange v. United Services Automobile Association 2 pre-
sented a question of first impression in Kentucky. 3 Laurie
LaFrange, a minor, was injured in an automobile accident caused
by an underinsured motorist.14 Joseph LaFrange, her father,
brought a declaratory judgment action to ascertain his rights
under the United Services Automobile Association (USAA) un-
derinsurance policy, which covered Laurie.55 LaFrange had paid
separate premiums on the policy for underinsured motorist cov-
erage of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident on each




Id. at 560. Although the court discussed both punitive and consequential dam-
ages, the jury had awarded only consequential damages. Id. at 559.
" No. 84-CA-304-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1984), aff'd, 700 S.W.2d 411 (Ky.
1985). The Supreme Court, affirming the court of appeals' decision, refused to address
the stacking issue, ruling instead that the language of the policy, providing for "an
offset for 'all sums paid,' " was broader than the "offset" language in the statute. 700
S.W.2d at 414. The court of appeals' decision remains relevant as an indicator of the
court's approach where stacking is an issue.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 2.
Id. KRS § 304.39-320 (1981) provides:
Every insurer shall make available upon request to its insureds underinsured
motorist coverage, whereby . . . the insurance company agrees to pay its
own insured for such uncompensated damages as he may recover on
account of an injury due to a motor vehicle accident because the judgment
recovered against the owner of the other vehicle exceeds the policy limits
thereon, to the extent of the policy limits on the vehicle of the party
recovering less the amount paid by the liability insurer of the party re-
covered against.
This section renders underinsured motorists coverage optional, not mandatory. Flowers
v. Wells, 602 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). For a complete discussion of underinsured
motorists coverage, see 8C APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5071.45 (1981).
" No. 84-CA-304-MR, slip op. at 3.
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LaFrange was entitled to stack the underinsured motorist cov-
erages of $25,000 per vehicle, thus recovering a total of $50,000.17
The trial court analogized this case to Ohio Casualty Insur-
ance Co. v. Stanfield,5 8 which addressed stacking uninsured mo-
torist coverage.5 9 The Stanfield Court ruled that the plaintiff,
the named insured, was entitled to broad protection, and thus
had a reasonable expectation that payment of separate premiums
on two vehicles increased his coverage.60 Therefore, the insured
could stack his uninsured motorist coverage. 6' In view of Stan-
field, the trial court found that LaFrange could stack underin-
surance coverage, as Laurie fell within the broad protection
provided by the USSA policy. 62
The court of appeals disagreed, however, based on the pol-
icy's language, which limited USAA's liability. 6 The policy ex-
pressly stated that the limit of underinsured motorist coverage
provided by the policy for any one person's injuries sustained
in any one accident was the maximum USAA would "pay re-
gardless of the number of ... [v]ehicles or premiums shown in
the Declaration.' '64 The language of the policy clearly prevented
stacking of the two vehicles' underinsured motorist coverages. 6
Thus, the court of appeals ruled that LaFrange's "separate
premium gave him separate coverage, not double coverage, and
that the 'reasonable expectations' discussed in Stanfield do not
exist here." '66
Id. at 3-4. Stacking contemplates reimbursement of the insured by more than
one policy. Liability on the insured's second policy usually arises only after the coverage
limit of the insured's primary policy is exhausted. Thus, where stacking is permitted an
insured has additional sources of compensation, because there is no proration between
insurers. P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS § 25.5(B) (1972); Straub, Kentucky Law
Survey-Insurance, 68 Ky. L.J. 587, 596 n.42 (1979-80).
581 S.W.2d 555 (Ky. 1979). Stanfield is discussed in Straub, supra note 57, at
596-98.
No. 84-CA-304-MR, slip op. at 6.
581 S.W.2d at 559.
6' Id.




66 Id. at 8. Cf. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Short, 603 S.W.2d 496 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1980). In Short, the court held that the insured was not entitled to stack the
uninsured motorist coverage his single policy provided for his van and motorcycle, even
[Vol. 74
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II. MOTOR VEHICLE REPARATIONS ACT
A. Attorneys' Fees
During the survey period, both the Kentucky Court of
Appeals67 and the Kentucky Supreme Court 6 interpreted the
attorneys' fees provision of Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
section 304.39-070(5), a part of the MVRA. The statute provides:
An attorney representing a secured person in any action filed
under KRS 304.39-060[69] shall be entitled to a reasonable attor-
neys' fee in the event that reparation benefits[7"] paid to said
secured person by that secured person's reparation's obligor[7" ]
are reimbursed by any insurance carrier on behalf of a tort-
feasor who is the defendant in any such action filed by the
said secured person or in the event such potential "action" is
settled by said potential tortfeasor's insurance carrier on his
behalf prior to the filing of any such suit.[ 2]
MFA Insurance Co. v. CarrolPa involved an attorney em-
ployed by a decedent's representative to handle a wrongful death
action against the tortfeasor's insurer, State Farm Mutual Au-
tomobile Insurance Company (State Farm). The attorney ac-
cepted State Farm's offer of $65,000 for settlement of the estate's
claim and $10,000 for basic reparation benefits. The $10,000
reparation check was made payable to MFA Insurance Company
(MFA) as reimbursement for the benefits MFA paid to its in-
sured's estate upon his death. 74
though the insured had paid separate premiums for each vehicle. Id. at 497. Like the
insurance policy in LaFrange, the policy in Short expressly precluded such double
recovery. See id.
MFA Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 687 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
Baker v. Motorist Ins. Co., 695 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1985).
KRS § 304.39-060 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1984) governs tort actions brought
to recover damages arising out of motor vehicle accidents.
Basic reparation benefits are defined as "benefits providing reimbursement for
net loss suffered through injury arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle . . . " KRS § 304.39-020(2) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
71 A reparation obligor is "an insurer, self-insurer, or obligated government pro-
viding basic reparation benefits .. ." KRS § 304.39-020(13).
12 KRS § 304.39-070(5) (1981).




In construing the statute, the court of appeals held that where
an insurer or reparations obligor claimed its subrogation rights
in arbitration instead of "intervening as a party in its insured's
pending tort action, and has not employed the attorneys for the
insured to represent its interest, those attorneys are not entitled
to the award of an attorneys' fee under KRS 304.39-070(5)
merely because the insurer's subrogation claim is subsequently
paid."' 75 Judge Gudgel distinguished Carroll from an earlier case,
Woodall v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co. 76 In Woodall the Court
awarded fees to the plaintiff's attorney in a tort action under
KRS section 304.39-070(5). 77 Woodall differed from the instant
case because in Woodall the insurer intervened in the plaintiff's
tort action against the tortfeasor to assert its subrogation claim.78
Thus, the plaintiff's attorney directly assisted the plaintiff's in-
surer in recovering the benefits it had paid to the plaintiff.79
During this survey period, the Kentucky Supreme Court
decided Baker v. Motorists Insurance Co.,80 a case factually
similar to Carroll. In Baker, Motorist Insurance Company (Mo-
torist) paid basic reparation benefits to Smith, its insured, while
Smith prosecuted her personal injury claim against the tortfeasor
and his insurer, Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies (Fire-
man's Fund)." Baker, Smith's attorney, settled her claim against
Fireman's Fund for $10,500. Fireman's Fund also issued a sep-
arate check made payable to Motorist and Baker to reimburse
Motorist for its previous payment of the no-fault benefits to
Smith. Baker claimed that, under KRS section 304.39-070(5), he
was entitled to an attorney's fee for securing the reimburse-
ment.8 2 The trial court held that "Baker 'may be entitled to a
reasonable attorney's fee, but reasonable may be zero.' -83The
11 Id. at 555. The court further remarked that by obtaining a settlement for the
estate within State Farm's policy limits, the attorney indirectly conferred a benefit on
MFA. The indirect benefit, however, was not sufficient to mandate an award of an
attorney's fee. See id.
1 648 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1983), cited in 687 S.W.2d at 554.
77 648 S.W.2d at 873.
78 687 S.W.2d at 555 (construing 648 S.W.2d at 873).
79 Id.
695 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1985).





court of appeals affirmed that decision, and the Kentucky Su-
preme Court granted discretionary review. 84
The Supreme Court stated that reasonable attorneys' fees
can be calculated only by considering the circumstances of each
case.8 Rejecting two factors that the court of appeals in MFA
Insurance Co. considered significant,86 the Supreme Court ruled
that the award of an attorney's fee "is not dependent upon the
reparation obligor employing the insured's attorney to represent
its subrogation interest ' 8 7 nor is it dependent upon the repara-
tion obligor's intervening in the tort action being pursued by the
insured's attorney.8 8 The Court concluded that an attorney is
entitled to an attorney's fee under KRS section 304.39-070(5)
only if his "representation of the insured conferred a benefit on
the reparation obligor." 8 9 There was no evidence that Motorist
received a benefit from Baker's activities. 90 Thus, the Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court that under these circumstances
"a reasonable fee is no fee." 9'
B. Calculation of Net Loss
In Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,92 a reparation obligor brought a subrogation
action against a tortfeasor's insurer to recover work loss benefits
the obligor had paid to its insured.93 The trial court denied
- Id.
' Id.
See text accompanying notes 75-79 supra.
" 695 S.W.2d at 416-17 (citing Morris & McGliney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
657 S.W.2d 248 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 602 S.W.2d
181 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (emphasis in original)).
695 S.W.2d at 417.
Id. The reparation obligor cannot avoid paying an attorney's fee if the circum-
stances show that the obligor received a benefit from the attorney. Id. (citing 602 S.W.2d
181). Benefits will result "from establishing liability, from establishing the right to
payment of disputed medical expenses or wages, or by other proof of benefit conferred."
695 S.W.2d at 417.
I /d.
' /d.
"2 681 S.W.2d 919 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
9, Id. " 'Work loss' means loss of income from the work the injured person would
probably have performed if he had not been injured .... reduced by any income from
substitute work actually performed by him .... " KRS § 304.39-020(5)(b).
1985-86]
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recovery of the full amount because the insured received addi-
tional benefits under a union contract, which is a collateral
source.9 4 The trial court's decision was based on Rankin v.
Bluegrass Boys Ranch, Inc.,95 which caused the court to reduce
the amount of work loss the insured sustained by the total
collateral source payments she received. 96 Thus, the trial court
permitted the reparation obligor to recover from the tortfeasor's
insurer only the amount of loss actually sustained by the in-
sured. 97
The court of appeals in Farm Bureau reversed the lower
court's decision, relying upon the express language of the
MVRA. 9 KRS section 304.39-020(2) states that reparation ben-
efits are designed to reimburse the insured for net loss.99 Net
loss is defined in KRS section 304.39-020(10) as "loss less ben-
efits or advantages, from sources other than basic and added
reparation insurance, required to be subtracted from loss in
calculating net loss."'0 However, the only benefits required to
be subtracted prior to 1982 were social security payments and
workers' compensation benefits.' 0 Thus, the court held that the
language of the MVRA was an express indication of that legis-
lative intent. Therefore, the union contract benefits that the
insured received should not have been deducted from the amount
1 681 S.W.2d at 919-20.
9 Id. (citing Rankin v. Bluegrass Boys Ranch, Inc., 469 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1971)).
The sum of the plaintiff's lost wages should be reduced by the amount, if any, that the
plaintiff's employer paid to him out of a legal obligation. Id. at 774.
681 S.W.2d at 920.
97 Id.
9 Id. at 920-21.
Id. at 920 (citing KRS § 304.39-020(2)). Cf. Underwood, Kentucky Law Survey-
Insurance, 72 Ky. L.J. 403, 425 (1983-84) ("In order to 'coordinate benefits' available
to an accident victim, the typical no-fault statute modifies the familiar 'collateral source
rule,' and provides benefits for 'net loss.' ").
0 KRS § 304.39-020(10). See generally, Straub, supra note 57, at 603-05 (discussing
problems with computing loss in United State Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Smith, 580
S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1979) and Ammons v. Winklepleck, 570 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978)).
,ol KRS § 304.39-120(1) (1981). In 1982, the statute was amended by removing the
requirement that social security benefits be deducted from net loss. KRS § 304.39-120(l)
(Cum. Supp. 1984). The accident occurred in 1979. 681 S.W.2d at 920. See Underwood,
supra note 99, at 425-26.
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of basic reparation benefits that the reparations obligor was
entitled to recover from the tortfeasor's insurer. 0 2
C. Threshold
The MVRA provides that a threshold amount must be met
before a plaintiff can commence a tort action against a tortfea-
sor.03 To reach that statutory level the plaintiff must introduce
evidence of either a permanent injury or medical expenses greater
than $1,000.10-
In Southard v. Hancock,05 the trial court admitted into
evidence the insured plaintiff's medical bills, even though the
bills were paid by the plaintiff's no-fault insurance carrier. 0 6
The jury awarded the plaintiff $23,111.27. The trial court, how-
ever, reduced the judgment by $3,111.27, which represented the
medical bills paid by the plaintiff's insurer. 0 7
On appeal the tortfeasor contended that the trial court erred,
as a matter of law, in admitting the plaintiff's medical expenses
into evidence. 03 The tortfeasor argued that the plaintiff's in-
surer, not the plaintiff, was the real party-in-interest as to the
medical bills it paid. ' 9 In addition, the tortfeasor contended that
she was unduly prejudiced by the trial court's action.1 ° In af-
firming the trial court's judgment, the court of appeals recog-
nized that the plaintiff had to introduce evidence of her medical
expenses to satisfy the statutory threshold requirement.", The
court also noted that the plaintiff did not receive a double
recovery for her medical bills, because the trial court reduced
the verdict by their amount."' 2 "Simply stated, although the
681 S.W.2d at 920-21.
KRS § 304.39-060 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
KRS § 304.39-060(2)(b).




Id. (citing Hargett v. Dodson, 597 S.W.2d 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)).
689 S.W.2d at 617.
Id. The plaintiff had to introduce evidence of her medical expenses because she
was not permanently injured and because the tortfeasor did not stipulate to the amount
of the plaintiff's medical expenses. Id.
M Id. at 617-18 (citing Smith v. Earp, 449 F. Supp. 503 (W.D. Ky. 1978); Thomp-
son v. Piasta, 662 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983)).
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[plaintiff] made a 'claim' for her medical expenses, she did not
seek a recovery for them." ' 3 Moreover, the court reasoned that
absent evidence of the plaintiff's medical expenses, the jury
might have been unduly prejudiced toward the tortfeasor." 4
CONCLUSION
Kentucky courts ruled on several important insurance law
issues during this survey period. Decisions dealing with policy
coverage questions included: the application of the word "acci-
dent" within a double indemnity provision, clarification of the
extent to which the household exclusion clause is valid, refine-
ment of the standard for recovering consequential damages for
an insurer's bad faith denial of insurance proceeds, and the
possibility of underinsurance stacking.
The courts interpreted several sections of the MVRA. Both
the Kentucky Supreme Court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals
analyzed the circumstances that permit recovery of attorneys'
fees under KRS section 304.39-070(5). The relationship under
the MVRA between the calculation of net loss and collateral
source payments also was determined. Finally, the validity of
introducing into evidence medical bills previously paid by an
insurer, to meet the statutorily required threshold, was tested.
" 689 S.W.2d at 618.
14 Id.
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